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The purpose of this study is to examine the factors most 
associated with the probability of Texas high schools failing 
to make Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) under NCLB, 
examining the entire population of all Texas public and 
charter high schools from 2003-2011, n=1721.  While 
literature to date focuses on the different variables that may 
affect schools in meeting AYP as well as addressing the 
success and failure of charter schools, there is a lack of 
research on the specific variables that have the most impact 
on failing to meet AYP, considered here as a “hazard”.  We 
used discrete time hazard modeling to estimate the 
probability of a school failing AYP for the first time in the 
time period. Our findings indicate that rural schools were 
the least likely to fail AYP, while schools with higher 
percentages of African American and Hispanic students and 
larger class sizes and enrollments failed AYP much more 
often. As a components of the AYP state determinations, 
school percent met standard in mathematics and attendance 
were significant in the model, while graduation rates were 
not.  This study provides one of the first opportunities to 
examine the year-by-year hazard of failing AYP in Texas 
over the first decade of NCLB implementation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the factors most 
associated with the probability of Texas high schools failing 
to meet Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) during the first 
decade of No Child Left Behind (NCLB).  This study 
focuses on the hazard probability of failing to meet AYP 
and the factors that most influence the failure to meet AYP 
utilizing data from the Texas Education Agency (TEA) for 
the years 2003 – 2011 and the National Center for 
Education Statistics (NCES) Common Core of Data.   
 
Although both secondary and elementary campuses are 
required to meet AYP in Texas during this time period, this 
study only focused on high school campuses.  While NCLB 
was designed to identify schools that fail to meet the 
educational needs of low-income and minority students, it 
was also designed to identify high schools that consistently 
have high numbers of students who do not perform at a 
proficient academic level and do not graduate from high 
school within four years.  While literature to date identifies 
numerous variables affecting high school failure to meet 
AYP, the challenges schools and districts face in meeting 
the requirements of NCLB, and the impact of failing to meet 
AYP, there is no current research on the specific variables 
that have the most impact on failing to meet AYP  (Balfanz, 
Legters, West, & Weber, 2007; Lee & Reeves, 2012; Linn, 
2003; Mintrop & Sunderman, 2009; "NCLB," 2002).     
 
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
Pressure from business and political leaders to develop an 
accountability system gained strength in the 1980s after the 
publication of A Nation at Risk underscored how poorly 
American high school students performed on international 
assessments (U.S. Department of Education & The National 
Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983).  What A 
Nation at Risk failed to emphasize was that results were 
unreliable because comparisons were not based upon equal 
cohorts (Berliner & Biddle, 1995).  Furthermore, the authors 
failed to highlight that the difference in average scores was 
quite small.  Whereas an average score of 38% earned the 
United States a 10
th
 place ranking, a 44% earned Scotland a 
4
th
 place ranking.  Moreover, tests in algebra in 8
th
 grade 
ranked American students dead last, yet most American 
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students do not take algebra in 8
th
 grade.  When comparing 
the elite students who do take algebra in 8
th
 grade to elite 
Japanese students in 8
th
 grade, American students scored 
higher.  Despite statistical evidence to the contrary, 
corporate America and government officials had a scapegoat 
for the economic woes of the country and began blaming a 
poor educational system for the economic problems of the 
country (Berliner & Biddle, 1995; Bracey, 1996; Hursh, 
2007; Sloane & Kelly, 2003). 
 
In response to pressure from business and political leaders, 
most states began developing curricular standards and 
utilizing standardized tests to assess achievement.  Texas 
was one of the first states to develop statewide standardized 
tests in the 1980s, and it began requiring minimum 
competency testing for graduation in 1987.  In 1993, the 
State developed the Public Education Information System 
(PEIMS) to track data and begin holding schools 
accountable.  Schools were measured on the total number of 
students passing the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills 
(TAAS) reading and math assessments with a 70% or higher 
and the annual dropout or completion rate.  Additionally, 
campuses had to meet the same requirements within the 
disaggregated by subgroup populations – White, African 
American, Hispanic, and economically disadvantaged.  
Campuses and districts were rated exemplary if 90% of the 
total students, as well as the disaggregate subpopulations, 
were proficient and the dropout rate did not exceed 1%.  
They were rated recognized if 5% of the total population 
and subgroups met the passing standard and less than a 
3.5% dropout rate, and they were rated acceptable if 50% of 
the students and each subgroup were rated proficient and no 
more than a 6% dropout rate. Anything lower than these 
scores and dropout rates earned campuses and districts a 
low-performing rating.  During the mid-late 1990s, the 
passing standard increased from 70% to 80%, and a new test 
was introduced.  The Texas Assessment of Knowledge and 
Skills (TAKS) was no longer a minimum competency test, 
but one of increased rigor and high-stakes (Vasquez Heilig  
& Darling-Hammond, 2008).   
 
Up until 2002 each state determined the significance of their 
assessments.  In 2002, utilizing Texas as a model, President 
George W. Bush signed into law the reauthorization of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 which 
became known as the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) 
(Hursh, 2005).   With the implementation of NCLB in 2002, 
states and school districts have faced increasing pressure to 
meet federal accountability standards in order to continue 
receiving federal funding.  If schools or districts receive 
federal funds, such as Title I funds due to the number of 
low-income students, they must meet Adequate Yearly 
Progress” (AYP) in order to maintain these federal funds.  
AYP measures include performance on state standardized 
tests in both reading and mathematics and another indicator.  
In Texas, attendance is the other indicator for elementary 
schools, and completion rate is the other indicator for high 
schools.   
 
Meeting AYP means schools must have proficient scores by 
state standards in reading and math and in all subgroup 
populations, which includes White, African American, 
Hispanic, Asian, Native American, economically 
disadvantaged, limited English proficient, and special 
education students.  If a school fails to meet AYP for two 
years in a row, regardless of the indicator in which they fail 
to meet the standard, students in that school must be given 
an option to transfer to another public school that has not 
been identified as needing improvement,  and the district 
must provide students opportunities for supplemental 
services, such as tutoring provided by outside agencies, 
remedial classes, and summer school.  In addition, if the 
school fails to meet AYP for a third consecutive year, the 
district must take corrective action.  During the fourth year 
of AYP failure, the district must develop plans for 
restructuring the school, and if the school fails in the fifth 
year, the district is required to implement the restructuring, 
which may include being converted into a charter school, or 
being closed (Lee & Reeves, 2012; Linn, 2003; "NCLB," 
2002).   
 
Advocates of NCLB and standardized assessments argue 
that the implementation of such measures increases 
educational equality, while opponents, contend that the high 
stakes tests associated with NCLB have actually reduced 
educational standards because teachers are teaching to the 
tests or states have lowered the proficiency standards to 
allow students to meet the norm.  Some research indicates 
that students in lower grade levels are performing better on 
the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) 
after the implementation of NCLB, thus reducing the 
achievement gap.  Other studies, however, indicate that the 
achievement gap has, at best, fallen flat if not widened in 
high school (Amrein & Berliner, 2003; B. Fuller, Wright, 
Gesicki, & Kang, 2007; E. J. Fuller & Johnson, 2001; 
Haertel, 1999; Hursh, 2005; Lee & Reeves, 2012; McDill, 
Natriello, & Aaron, 1986; Wei, 2012).   
 
While there is some evidence that accountability has 
benefited some minority and economically disadvantaged 
students, the evidence is thin and contradictory (Lauen & 
Gaddis, 2012).  Two studies reported sizeable gains for 
fourth-grade students on math National Assessment of 
Educational Progress (NAEP) scores and smaller, but 
significant gains for eighth-grade math scores, while other 
studies indicate that there have been no gains and some 
regression in the achievement gap between Whites and 
minority students, particularly the Black-White achievement 
gap and predominantly in states with more rigorous 
achievement assessments.  The largest test disparities occur 
in schools that are racially segregated, with Whites 
outperforming all groups and Hispanics outperforming 
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Blacks (Dee & Jacob, 2011; Hanushek & Raymond, 2005; 
Lee & Reeves, 2012; Price, 2010; Stiefel, Schwartz, & 
Chellman, 2007; Weckstein, 2003; Wei, 2012).     
 
Many large school districts are attempting to meet AYP 
standards in high poverty schools  by breaking them into 
smaller schools in an effort to improve educational 
inequalities (Orfield & Lee, 2005).  Unfortunately, this leads 
to even more segregated schools (Orfield & Lee, 2005).  
Furthermore, attempting to create smaller schools 
exacerbates the already strained financial purse-strings 
many school districts face.  Nonetheless, if the districts are 
unable to improve the performance of failing schools, they 
will be forced to provide supplemental educational services, 
including after-hours tutoring from inside or outside 
sources, and allow students to choose to attend schools that 
are not failing (Burch, Steinberg, & Donovan, 2007; 
DiMartino & Scott, 2013; Heinrich, Meyer, & Whitten, 
2010).  School choice for some districts could be 
devastating due to overcrowding or failing to meet their 
court-mandated desegregation orders.  Insufficient capacity 
may not be used as a reason to not offer school choice; thus, 
districts are required to create additional capacity without 
funding to do so (2002).  Although some districts have filed 
suit against the government to block the school choice 
mandate because NCLB choice will cause them to violate 
their court-ordered desegregation, a pre-standing court 
desegregation mandate does not exempt the district from 
NCLB compliance (DeBray-Pelot, 2007).  According to 
NCLB, a district is required to secure a court’s approval to 
change its desegregation plan.  Failure to secure the court 
order puts a district out of compliance with Title I under 
NCLB.  Yet, if they allow school choice, they are out of 
compliance with their court-ordered desegregation plan, 
leaving districts in a no-win situation  (DeBray-Pelot, 2007). 
 
NCLB also requires that states introduce “sanctions and 
rewards” relevant to every school and based on their AYP 
status.  It mandates explicit and increasingly severe 
sanctions for persistently low-performing schools that 
receive Title I aid.  Sanctions include anything from 
implementing public-school choice to staff replacement to 
school restructuring.   According to data from the Schools 
and Staffing Survey of the National Center for Education 
Statistics, 54.4 percent of public schools participated in Title 
I services during the 2003–04 school year.  Some states 
applied these explicit sanctions to schools not receiving 
Title I assistance as well.  For example, 24 states introduced 
accountability systems that threatened all low-performing 
schools with reconstitution, regardless of whether they 
received Title I assistance (Dee & Jacob, 2010). 
Some schools and districts are being met with the challenge 
of pulling resources from other areas to meet the mandates.  
Research indicates that school district expenditures have 
increased by nearly $600 per pupil due to direct student 
instruction and educational support services, yet the 
increased expenditure was not matched by federal funding 
support, nor was there increased test score gains associated 
with the increased expenditures (Dee, Jacob, M., & Ladd, 
2010).  The direct costs of managing an accountability 
system are quite small on a per-pupil basis. However, 
standards-based reforms have often been presented to the 
public as a trade: greater resources and flexibility for 
educators in exchange for greater accountability (Dee et al., 
2010).  
 
One of the most strident criticisms of NCLB is that it failed 
to deliver on this bargain (Dee et al., 2010).    One 
noteworthy study on the relationship of spending and 
accountability is an analysis of district-level expenditure 
data from 1991-1997, produced by the National Center for 
Education Statistics (Hannaway, McKay, & Nakib, 2002).   
The study examined four states that implemented 
comprehensive accountability programs in the 1990s – 
Kentucky, Maryland, North Carolina, and Texas.  They 
found that only Texas and Kentucky increased educational 
expenditure more than the national average, but those 
increases were substantial.   An additional study suggests 
that the major pre-NCLB accountability reforms in Florida 
were associated with increased expenditure for instructional 
staff support and professional development, particularly in 
low-performing schools.   What is not clear is whether the 
accountability policy caused the increased expenditure or 
whether both were merely parts of a broader reform agenda. 
Overall, the extant literature offers at best suggestive 
evidence on how accountability reforms may have 
influenced school spending (Dee & Jacob, 2010; Rouse, 
Hannaway, Goldhaber, & Figlio, 2007). 
 
To provide new evidence on how NCLB influenced local 
school finances, Dee, Jacobs, and Schwartz (2010) pooled 
annual, district-level data on revenue and expenditure from 
U.S. Census surveys of school district finances over the 
period from 1994 to 2008. Their sample consisted of all 
operational, unified school districts nationwide for each 
survey year.  To identify the effects of NCLB accountability 
on district finances, they utilized cross-state trend analysis, 
comparing within-state changes in school finance measures 
across states with and without pre-NCLB accountability 
programs.  The results indicate that total per-pupil 
expenditure rose more quickly from 1994 to 2002 in states 
that adopted pre-NCLB accountability policies, and 
continued to grow, albeit more slowly, following the 
introduction of NCLB, suggesting that NCLB increased 
expenditure.  The results indicate that NCLB increased total 
current expenditure by $570 per pupil, or by 6.8 percent 
from the 1999–2000.  The increased expenditure was 
allocated to direct instruction and support services.  Results 
also reveal that the increased expenditure was not matched 
by corresponding increases in federal support, consistent 
with allegations that NCLB constitutes an unfunded 
mandate.  It should be noted, however, that the increase in 
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spending on student support was not statistically significant. 
Furthermore, the effects were fairly similar across districts 
with different baseline levels of student poverty, suggesting 
that NCLB did not meaningfully influence distributional 
equity (Dee, Jacob, and Schwartz 2010). 
 
Furthermore, under NCLB, states are required to withhold 
2% of Title I funds for school improvement plans and local 
education agencies are required to hold and additional 10% 
of the federal funds they receive in reserve to provide for 
potential supplemental educational services instead of 
issuing it to schools that are most in need of the support.  
State education agencies also have the option of withholding 
an additional 5% of the funds in reserve for possible actions 
from the United States Department of Education (Johnson, 
2007; United States Department of Education, 2002).   
Thus, schools and districts are being required to execute 
changes that cost them significantly with less money than 
they were originally allotted (Dee & Jacob, 2010; Johnson, 
2007; Loveless, 2006).   
 
In addition to schools and districts facing punitive financial 
measures enacted through NCLB, states are faced with the 
costs associated with implementing high stakes testing.  
Since 2010, New York awarded $33 million in contracts to 
Pearson Education to develop its states’ standardized tests 
(DiMartino & Scott, 2013).  Texas awarded approximately 
$90 million in contracts to Pearson Education to develop 
their new STAAR tests, and the costs will continue to rise 
with growth and the scoring of tests (Texas Education 
Agency, 2010).  California’s projected cost for the 2011-
2014 standardized assessment contracts $167.5 million in 
creating and scoring the high-stakes tests that are required 
(California Department of Education, 2012).  These funds 
could be applied to new programs aimed at truly improving 
education, yet they are going to private, for-profit industries, 
such as Pearson Education.   
 
While states are spending millions of dollars in contracts to 
develop these standardized tests, many political leaders 
consider the use free-enterprise principles, such as school 
choice and private outside sources, will improve the 
educational system through accountability and development.  
The argument is that the public sector is too bureaucratic 
and disinterested in innovation.  (DeBray-Pelot & McGuinn, 
2009; DiMartino & Scott, 2013).   
 
Proponents of charter schools claim they are innovative, yet 
their definition of innovation does not necessarily apply to 
classroom practices.  There are very few studies that look at 
the classroom practices of charter schools, but the findings 
of those studies indicate that the classroom practices of 
charter schools are similar to those in public schools.  Thus, 
the innovation in charter schools is based upon finance, 
organization, and autonomy.  Additionally, it is not clear 
that charter schools are more effective in educating students 
than public schools.  Some research indicates that test scores 
are improved when children attend charter schools, while 
other research suggests that charter school students are less 
successful than public school students (Bulkley & Fisler, 
2003).  In Washington D.C., more than 75% of students in 7 
of the 16 charter schools scored below basic in math and 
reading.  When compared to non-charter public schools in 
Washington D.C., test results were mixed but suggested that 
public charter schools were not achieving higher standards.  
In Texas, only 40% of the initial charter schools received 
ratings of academically acceptable or higher compared to 
91% of public schools (Bulkley & Fisler, 2003; May, 2006).  
Yet, comparisons are difficult because the demographics of 
a charter school are not always similar to the surrounding 
public school.  Furthermore, although charter schools are 
required to accept all students, they have been found to 
counsel parents of students with special needs to not enroll 
their child (Bulkley & Fisler, 2003; DiMartino & Scott, 
2013; Henig, 1990; May, 2006).   
 
Proponents of school choice also advocate the use of outside 
resources for remediation.  NCLB mandates that schools 
who fail to make AYP for three consecutive years provide 
services to students to improve scores.  While tutoring may 
be provided by school personnel after hours, supplement 
education services (SES) must also be offered through 
outside agencies at the schools’ expense.  Research 
indicates, however, that many of the private contractors 
used for SES are ineffective.  Surveys show that many of 
the students who attend these outside supplemental 
educational services received very little instruction and 
virtually no one on one time aimed at improving their 
scores.  Furthermore, instructional practices varied greatly 
between service providers, and even within the same 
provider, depending upon the setting and tutor.  Although 
research suggests problems with these private contractors, 
the legislation strongly discourages any attempts by states 
and school districts to regulate tutorial services and the 
choices offered to parents (Heinrich et al., 2010).   
 
With the implementation of NCLB, many state and local 
leaders were stunned at the number of their schools and 
districts that were previously recognized as successful 
schools being labeled as needing improvement or failing.  
Frequently, this is a result of not meeting standards within 
the subpopulations groups.  Campuses that have few 
students have a far more difficult time of meeting the 
standard than campuses with larger populations (Fusarelli, 
2004; Koyama, 2012; Novak & Fuller, 2003).   
 
In order for districts and campuses to meet AYP on the 
reading/ELA and mathematics assessments, they must meet 
criteria based upon participation and performance.  To meet 
the participation component, districts and campuses must 
have at least 95% of all students and student groups take the 




Performance criteria requires districts and campuses to meet 
a specified passing rate each year for all student groups.  
Each year the specified pass rate increases, culminating in a 
100% pass rate for all students by 2014.  If campuses fail to 
meet the required performance measures, they may still 
meet AYP based upon required improvement or Safe 
Harbor.  Safe Harbor is based upon two components.  First, 
schools must show a 10% performance improvement for the 
student group on which they do not meet the standard and 
second they must also meet the criteria for the relevant other 
measure requirement for the student group. The 
performance improvement portion of the safe harbor 
calculation requires the calculation of actual change, defined 
as the current year number of students meeting the 
proficiency standard divided by the total number of students 
tested minus the previous year’s number of students meeting 
the standard divided by the total number of students tested 
for that year.  The actual change must be equal to or greater 
than the required improvement.  If a campus was not 
measured on an item during the previous year and did meet 
the standard during the current year, they fail to meet AYP.   
In 2008, the United States Department of Education (USDE) 
approved an amendment to the requirement of the other 
measure in Safe Harbor for AYP that allows districts and 
campuses to meet the absolute standard for the other 
measure in order to satisfy required improvement.  Thus, in 
the State of Texas, districts and campuses seeking to use 
required improvement must meet or exceed the graduation 
rate goal, annual targets, or alternatives for high schools and 
the attendance rate for elementary and middle schools must 
increase at least one-tenth of a percent (Texas Education 
Agency, 2012).   
 
Moreover, districts and campuses missing the performance 
component on an indicator in one year but meeting it the 
next year may still fail to meet AYP if the participation 
component is not met.  In such cases, the district or campus 
is considered to have missed AYP for that indicator two 
consecutive years, potentially triggering Title I school 
improvement program (SIP) requirements.  The opposite 
also holds.  If the district or campus misses participation on 
an indicator the first year,  meets it the following year but 
misses performance for the same indicator, then the district 
or campus is again considered missing AYP for that 
indicator two consecutive years ("NCLB," 2002; Texas 
Education Agency, 2012).  
 
Furthermore, NCLB legislation requires that states assess all 
students in reading/ELA including limited English 
proficient students.  In Texas, English language learners 
may take the Texas English Language Proficiency 
Assessment System (TELPAS) test as part of the reading 
assessment.  These results are used in lieu of the State of 
Texas Academic Assessment Reading (STAAR) system 
results for first-year or recent immigrants.  Since the 
inception of STAAR, LEP students may take both TELPAS 
and STAAR-L (a linguistically accommodated version of 
STAAR), however, when this occurs, only the STAAR 
assessment results are used in the AYP reading calculation 
for that student.  Decisions as to which test(s) the student 
should take are made by the language proficiency 
assessment committee (LPAC) (Texas Education Agency, 
2012). 
 
The other indicator used in Texas to measure AYP for high 
schools is graduation rate.  The term graduates is based 
upon a longitudinal completion rate which is the percentage 
of students beginning in ninth grade who complete their 
high school education by the expected date.  The 
longitudinal completion class has four components:  1) the 
percentage of students who complete high school by their 
expected graduation date or earlier; 2) the percentage of 
students who fail to complete by the end of four years but 
enroll in a public education institution the following year; 3) 
the percentage of students who earn a general educational 
development (GED) certificate; 4) the percentage of 
students who drop out of school (Texas Education Agency, 
2012).     
 
Not only do districts and campuses have to meet standards 
in assessment, participation, graduation, and attendance for 
the entire campus, they are required to meet the standards 
for all subgroups, including:  English language learners, 
economically disadvantaged, special education, Hispanic, 
African American, Native American, White, and Asian.  
The student group is not included if the number of students 
in the subgroup is too small, as there is the potential to 
reveal personally identifiable information and the results 
would likely be statistically unreliable. Student group 
identifications are based on student characteristics and 
program participation used to report attendance rates for the 
state, and each state determines the number of students 
required to be included in the student group measure (B. 
Fuller et al., 2007; Fusarelli, 2004; Koyama, 2012; Linn, 
2003; "NCLB," 2002; Texas Education Agency, 2012). 
 
In Texas, for a student groups’ measure to be evaluated for 
AYP, a student group must have 50 students and account for 
10 percent of the student population or any group that has 
least 200 students will be evaluated, regardless of the 
percentage of population a district or campus. Furthermore, 
to be evaluated for AYP, a district or campus must have at 
least 9,000 days in membership for student groups of 50, 
36,000 days for student groups of 200, or comprise at least 
10 percent of total days in membership for all students 
(Texas Education Agency, 2012). Although attendance is 
the not an indicator for Texas high schools in meeting AYP, 
it is included as a variable in this study because all schools 
are required to report their attendance rates to the Texas 
Education Agency and the student group variables are based 
upon reported participation rates for each assessment.  
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Additionally, previous literature indicates that attendance is 
crucial in student success (Drewry, Burge, & Driscoll, 2010; 
M. Dynarski & Gleason, 2002; Steward, Devine Steward, 
Blair, Jo, & Hill, 2008; Stout & Christenson, 2009; Texas 
Education Agency, 2012).   
 
Meeting these criterion is exceedingly difficult for 
campuses, particularly those located in urban areas.  The 
ramifications are costly if a school fails to meet AYP for 
two years in a row. Regardless of the indicator in which 
they fail to meet the standard, students in the failing school 
must be given an option to transfer to another public school 
that has not been identified as needing improvement, with 
transportation provided by the district.  The district must 
also provide students opportunities for supplemental 
services, such as tutoring provided by outside agencies, 
remedial classes, and summer school.  In addition, if the 
school fails to meet AYP for a third consecutive year, the 
district must take corrective action.  During the fourth year 
of AYP failure, the district must develop plans for 
restructuring the school, and if the school fails in the fifth 
year, the district is required to implement the restructuring, 
which may include being converted into a charter school, or 
being closed (Lee & Reeves, 2012; Linn, 2003; "NCLB," 
2002).  Thus, the consequences for failing to meet AYP are 
high.  These consequences all have potentially high 
financial costs for the district, which are unfunded by the 
federal government.   
 
Framework of the present study: 
Thus, the aim of the present study is to analyze when 
campuses are most at risk for failing to meet AYP and 
which variables are most influential in the failure to meet 
AYP.  This study will provide a framework for future 
research to broaden the scope of analysis from Texas senior 
high schools to an analysis of both public high schools and 
charter schools to determine whether there is a difference in 
which schools fail to meet AYP, when they fail to meet 
AYP, and which variables are most significant in that failure 
to meet AYP.  Understanding where and when successes 
and failures occur and why would be beneficial to campus 
and district leaders to allow them to more effectively 
address the needs of students.  Additionally, future 
researchers could expand this study to other states and, 
potentially, a national study.  Hence, there is one central 
research question for this study and nine supporting 
questions. 
 
The central research question is: 
To what extent is the probability of Texas public and charter 
high schools failing to meet Adequate Yearly Progress 
(AYP) for the first time under NCLB from 2003-2011 
associated with the multiple variables that are known to be 





This study is a secondary analysis of publically available 
data from the Texas Education Agency (TEA) Division of 
Performance Reporting, Adequate Yearly Progress (TEA, 
2012) and the National Center for Education Statistics 
(NCES) Common Core of Data (CCD) (NCES, 2006) .  The 
TEA dataset is a comprehensive state-wide dataset that 
provides AYP results for all eligible schools in the State of 
Texas, as well as all variables associated with the AYP 
results, while the NCES CCD annually collects fiscal and 
non-fiscal public school data for all schools in the U.S.  The 
sample for this study includes the entire population of 
schools identified as senior high schools in the state of 
Texas (n=1721).  Utilizing these databases provides a 
unique opportunity to analyze the impact of NCLB on a 
large and diverse population, as well as the factors that 
contribute to success or failure of schools meeting AYP.  
Although both datasets provide information for all 
subpopulations that are included in determining AYP, some 
data is masked in order to adhere to the requirements of the 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), for 
schools with very low subpopulations.  
 
Variables Included in the Analytic Model 
The dependent variable in the following analysis is the 
probability of a high school failing Adequate Yearly 
Progress (AYP) status for the first time between the years 
2003 and 2011 in Texas.  AYP is the term used by NCLB to 
determine whether schools are making adequate 
improvements in educating students.  AYP requires all 
public schools to meet criteria based upon reading and math 
assessments, student groups, and another indicator.  In 
Texas, the other indicator for high schools it is graduation 
rate.  Student groups include Black, Hispanic, White, 
English language learners, economically disadvantaged, and 
special education students.   
 
We used previous literature to guide the selection of 
covariates and controls for this study  (Barton, 2006; 
Bridgeland, Dilulio, & Morison, 2006; Drewry et al., 2010; 
M. G. P. Dynarski, 2002; Elledge, Le Floch, Taylor, & 
Anderson, 2009a; Hursh, 2005; National Research Council, 
2001; Steward, Steward, Blair, Jo, & Hill, 2008; Stout & 
Christenson, 2009; Warren & Edwards, 2005).   Utilizing 
the recommendations of previous research (Bowers & Lee, 
2013), district urbanicity categories, based upon the U.S. 
Census metrocentric codes, were derived from the NCES 
CCD (NCES, 2006) and converted into the variables Urban, 
Small Town, and Rural, with Suburban as the reference 
group.  Background and control variables include Percent 
African American Students, Percent Hispanic Students, 
Percent Asian Students, Percent Students on Free and 
Reduced Lunch, Teacher Pupil Ratio, Total Enrollment, 
Attendance, Graduation, and Percent Met Standard on  
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TABLE 1: Descriptive Variables and Frequencies by Campus 
 
Name Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Urban 0.287 0.452 0 1 
Town 0.130 0.336 0 1 
Rural 0.316 0.465 0 1 
Attendance 92.681 0.035 48.10 100 
Graduation 82.238 18.824 0 100 
Math 63.294 17.901 2 99 
Percent Free & Reduced Lunch 
students 
0.381 0.218 0 0.99 
Total Student Enrollment 767.680 867.320 0 4679 
Pupil Teacher Ratio 13.080 6.868 0 201.00 
Percent African American 
students 
0.121 0.172 0 1.00 
Percent Hispanic students 0.361 0.310 0 1.00 
Percent Asian students 0.015 0.035 0 0.39 
N 1721    
 
TAKS Math Scores in 10
th
 Grade. Table 1 provides 
descriptive statistics for the variables, including mean, 
standard deviation, minimum, and maximum.   
 
Analysis  
For all models in this study, we used discrete time hazard 
modeling to model the probability of a high school in the 
state of Texas failing to meet AYP for the first time between 
2003 and 2011.  As a subset of survival analysis (Singer & 
Willett, 2003), discrete time hazard modeling is an attractive 
modeling framework for this type of data, since the event 
under consideration here is a heavily dependent and 
conditional event that is nested within time, a feature of the 
data which we aim to take advantage of through the use of 
discrete time hazard modeling, following the 
recommendations of past education research that has used 
this method, particularly examining the Texas context 
(Bowers, 2010; Bowers & Lee, 2013; Bowers & Metzger, 
2010b; Bowers, Metzger, & Militello, 2010a).  Briefly, the 
data are dependent and conditional due to the point that 
once a school has failed AYP for the first time, they cannot 
fail AYP for the first time again, which violates one of the 
central assumptions of inferential statistics and is accounted 
for through discrete time hazard modeling and the use of a 
“unit-period” dataset (Singer & Willet, 2003) in which each 
unit (here the entire population of secondary schools in 
Texas) are represented in the dataset multiple times, once 
for each year of data. Time varying and time invariant 
variables can then be estimated through a modified logistic 
regression framework in which each parameter is estimated 
on the probability of the “hazard” of the event occurring 
within any one year, controlling for the point that the event 
could have already happened in a previous year, and so the 
overall sample size and conditional probabilities for each 
year must be correctly adjusted and accounted for (Singer & 
Willett, 2003). 
 
Following the methods recommended for discrete time 
hazard modeling (Singer & Willett, 2003), the campus-level 
dataset was converted into a school-period dataset, in which 
each school was represented in the dataset with nine rows of 
data, one for each year, with event defined as AYP status 
the first time a campus failed to meet AYP.  Campuses who 
never failed to meet AYP were censored at the end of the 
study in 2011.  New campuses that were founded after 2003 
were included in the study with missing data for all 
8 
 
variables up until the time of entry and the first opportunity 
to fail to meet AYP.   
 
Thus, the dependent variable in all models was the 
probability of a campus failing AYP for the first time within 
any one year, 2003 through 2011. Following the 
recommendations from the previous literature, we included 
the above noted variables as either time dependent or time 
invariant variables in the subsequent models. Time invariant 
variables included in the study were the locale variables of 
Urban, Town and Rural.  Time variant variables include 
percent attendance, percent graduation, percent met standard 
on mathematics TAKS in 10
th
 grade, percent African 
American students, percent Hispanic students, percent Asian 
students, percent students on free and reduced lunch, teacher 
pupil ratio, and total enrollment.   
 
Using the nomenclature recommended by Singer & Willett 
(2003) for these types of models, logit discrete-time hazard 
models were estimated and fit to the AYP campus level 
data, as well as the calculation of life tables, and estimated 
hazard and survival functions.   The full model used for this 
analysis can be written as: 
 
logit(Y)  = α1Xperiod
1 +α2 Xperiod
2
 + α3 Xperiod
3 + α4 Xperiod
4 + α5 
Xperiod
5 + α6 Xperiod
6 + α7 Xperiod
7 + α8 Xperiod
8 + α9 Xperiod
9 
+ 
βURBAN X Urban + βTOWN X Town + βRURAL X Rural +  
βATTENDANCE  X Attendance + βGRADUATION  X Graduation + 
βMATH  X Math + βFREE & REDUCED LUNCH  X Free & Reduced 
Lunch + βTOTAL ENROLLMENT  X Total Enrollment + βPUPIL 
TEACHER RATIO  X Pupil Teacher Ratio + βAFRICAN AMERICAN  X 
African American + βHISPANIC X Hispanic + βASIAN  X Asian. 
 
RESULTS 
The purpose of this study is to examine when campuses are 
most at risk for failing to meet AYP and which variables are 
most associated with campus AYP failure.  Adequate Yearly 
Progress data and variables included in the determination of 
meeting AYP were recorded for the entire population of 
schools identified as senior high schools in the state of 
Texas (TEA, 2012).  The overall sample, n=1721, included 
all senior high school campuses in existence at any time 
between 2003-2011.   Locale-urbanicity variables were 
downloaded from NCES CCD (NCES, 2006).   Because 
campuses are not required to meet AYP their first year, that 
data is recorded as missing for schools that were founded 
during this time period.  Additionally, although both 
datasets provide information for all subpopulations that are 
included in determining AYP, some data is masked in order 
to adhere to the requirements of the Family Educational 
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), for schools with very low 
subpopulations.  All masked data is also recorded as 
missing. 
 
In this section, we first present a description of the overall 
AYP results in the state of Texas, to provide background 
and justification for the study.  Second, we discuss the 
hazard probability to show the proportion of campuses in 
the sample at risk for not meeting AYP.  Third, we detail the 
fit of the full model to the data and then finally, turn to a 
discussion of the results.  
 
Examining Overall State of Texas AYP Results  
As has been suggested in longitudinal data analysis 
literature (Mills, 2011; Singer & Willett, 2003), survival 
analysis was utilized to investigate the event occurrence of 
campuses failing to meet AYP.  This type of analysis has 
been shown to be superior to simple means and weighted 
means when analyzing the risk of a terminal event (Singer 
& Willet, 1995, 2003), such as failing to meet AYP, in 
which a campus, once it has failed AYP, cannot reverse its 
status and become a school that has never failed to meet 
AYP.  Survival analysis allows us to examine the campuses 
during each school year that are still at risk for not meeting 
AYP, rather than aggregating all years in the dataset.  This 
requires censoring, or removal of, two types of campuses 
from calculations during each school year – those that failed 
to meet AYP, since they cannot experience the event again 
for the first time, and those that ceased to be in existence.  
Table 2 presents a life table, as suggested by Singer and 
Willett (2003), detailing the AYP event histories for each 
year of the sample of 1721 campuses.  The life table, 
presented with hazard and survival estimates, is a more 
realistic representation over time than previous methods. 
 
The estimated hazard probability shows the proportion of 
campuses in the sample at the end of each school year still 
at risk of failing to meet AYP who failed to meet AYP for 
that school year.  In other words, any campus that missed 
AYP at the end of the school year were thus categorized as 
failing to meet AYP (Table 2, fifth column; Figure 1).  The 
analysis is read as the percentage risk of experiencing the 
event at each specific time point for the dataset.   
 
Additionally, plotting the hazard function allows for the 
visual identification and interpretation of the trend of 
campuses experiencing the event across time periods while 
controlling for the campuses that had experienced the event 
and are not in the dataset for subsequent years.  For 
example, a hazard probability of .144 in the fifth column of 
Table 2 for the year 2005, and plotted in Figure 1 (Panel A, 
right)  as YR2005, indicates that for individual campuses, 
14.4% of them experienced the event of missing AYP in 
2005 in Texas. 
 
Using these life table calculations, estimating the hazard 
function for failing to meet AYP, one can see that the 
probability of failing to meet AYP for this dataset was 
highest during the first year of AYP in the dataset in 2003, 
with 30.9% of campuses experiencing the event.  
Probabilities drop in 2004 7%, rises again in 2005 to 14.4% 
and then subsides until 2011 when 19.4% of the campuses  
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Table 2: Life table describing the number of campuses meeting AYP, the hazard and survival probabilities of meeting AYP, 
and the median lifetime of campuses meeting AYP. 
 
 Number Proportion 
Year Campuses 
meeting AYP at 
the beginning of 
the year 
Campuses who 
failed to meet 
AYP at the end 
of the year 
Campuses 
censored at the 
end of the year 








377 0 0.309 0.690 
2004 842 59 0 0.070 0.642 
2005 783 113 0 0.144 0.549 
2006 670 16 0 0.023 0.536 
2007 654 41 0 0.062 0.502 
2008 613 53 0 0.086 0.459 
2009 560 5 0 0.008 0.455 
2010 555 4 0 0.007 0.452 
2011 551 107 444 0.194 0.364 
Total 1721 775    
 
experienced the event of not meeting AYP. Thus, the most 
hazardous years for failing to meet AYP were 2003, 2005, 
and 2011.   
 
The final far-right column of Table 2 indicates the survival 
function which presents the data in a cumulative manner, 
displaying the data points as the percentage of the full 
sample that “survived”, i.e. those that did not experience the 
event of failing to meet AYP, while controlling for 
campuses that had already experienced the event and 
dropped out of the dataset (Table 3, sixth column, Figure 2).  
At the end of 2003, 69% of campuses had not experienced 
the event of failing to meet AYP.  The number of campuses 
who had not experienced the event consistently dropped 
during each year of the study, with only 36.4% of campuses 
surviving the event by 2011. Figure 1, panel A, plots these 
overall hazard and survival probabilities as a function 
through years 2003-2011. 
 
While the calculation of overall AYP results using survival 
analysis and life tables are interesting, these numbers do not 
give an indication of which variables are most associated 
with failure to meet AYP.  The main focus of this study is to 
combine and analysis of the timing of failing to meet AYP 
with an analysis of the variables required by NCLB to meet 
AYP, controlling for the demographics and locale of the 
school.   As discussed above, campuses must not only meet 
AYP criteria for the overall campus but also for the 
subpopulations and another indicator, which is graduation in 
Texas.  Additionally, as discussed above, urban areas and 
areas with densely populated groups within the 
subpopulations have a difficult time meeting the 
requirements of AYP. For many of these variables, the 
hazard and survival functions vary across the state when 
examining these variables individually. As an example, the 
locale urbanicity categories for the high schools were used 
to disaggregate the hazard and survival functions, plotted in 
Figure 1 panel B. As noted in Figure 1, urban schools in 
2003-2005 experienced the highest risk of failing to meeting 
AYP in the state, followed by suburban schools, small 
towns, and rural schools. However, by 2006, many of the 






Figure 1: Estimated hazard and survivor functions for failing AYP for the first time from 2003 through 
2011 for all secondary schools in Texas. Panel A plots the estimated hazard and survivor functions for 
the full sample. The two greatest years of the hazard of failing AYP for the first time were 2003 and 
2011, with 2009 and 2010 being the least hazardous years. The survival function shows that by 2011, 
only 36.4% of all secondary schools in Texas had not failed AYP at least once over the nine years. Panel 
B plots the estimated hazard and survivor functions disaggregated by school locale: urban, suburban, 
small town and rural. Note that after the first three years in the dataset, hazard rates converge as the 
schools that were most likely to fail AYP had most likely done so by 2006 for the first time within each 



















































































































hazard function appropriately accounts for this. Year 2011 
also of interest as the hazard of failing AYP for the first 
rises substantially. The corresponding survival functions 
show the cumulative survival of each of the different school 
locals over time, demonstrating that rural schools were the 
least likely to fail AYP throughout the full time period, 
followed by small towns, and suburban school, while urban 
schools experienced the highest risk of hazard generally 
throughout the dataset. Thus, these types of variables 
individually appear to covary in interesting ways through 
time with school AYP failure. We turn next to examining 
the variables together in a full discrete time hazard model. 
 
To address the question of the extent to which different 
variables, including graduation, attendance, location, and 
subpopulations may correspond to a campus’s increased risk 
of failing to meet AYP, we used discrete-time hazard 
models within a logistic regression framework (see 
methods).  As has been previously argued, a discrete-time 
hazard model using logit regression is superior for 
predicting a campus’s risk for failing to meet AYP.  This is 
because this type of modeling framework appropriately 
handles the dichotomous outcome variable (meeting AYP or 
not for the first time within a year), as well as campuses 
ceasing to exist through censoring or being founded across 
time, and the ability to include the effect of time within the 
equation.  Rather than experiencing a continuous change 
over time, campuses experience AYP failure at one point in 
the year with open periods between each discrete period.  
Thus, a discrete-time hazard model is appropriate for 
modeling the risk of failing to meet AYP and testing the 
different variables for the ability to predict which campuses 
may fail to meet AYP.   
 
A discrete-time hazard model was fitted to the data by 
estimating parameters for each time period and for each of 
the variables using logistic regression.  Discrete-time hazard 
models usually begin with a test for the significance of 
multiple pseudo “intercepts” for each time-point, modeling 
the effect of time in the analysis of a subject’s risk of the 
event.  Additional parameters that estimate the effects of 
variable collected on a sample are then fit to the model as β 
estimates, and then the model fit is assessed.  Four discrete-
time hazard models are presented in Table 3, listing 
parameter estimates and significance levels, standard errors 
for each estimate (in parentheses), the overall N of the 
campus-period dataset at each time-point, and tests of model 
goodness of fit, including -2Log-likelihood, Chi-Square, 
and Cox & Snell pseudo R
2
.   
 
The model was tested in a forward stepwise fashion, starting 
first with the “unconditional” model testing only the nine 
intercepts for time through the years. Estimated parameter 
coefficients are reported in logits. Time alone in the model 
explains an estimated 53.2% of the variance in the 
probability of a school failing to make AYP in any one year 
from 2003-2011. However, as noted in the literature (Singer 
& Willett, 2003), variance explained calculations of logistic 
regressions are estimates only, and must be interpreted 
cautiously since there are currently no precise means to 
calculate a true amount of variance explained within this 
modeling framework. We present the Cox & Snell pseudo-
R-squared as a means to help assess fit and the subsequent 
models. As noted in Table 3 Model A as well as Table 2 and 
Figure 1, the most hazardous years of failing to make AYP 
in the unconditional model were 2003 and 2011. Continuous 
variables included in the model were all standardized (z-
scored). Model B includes the locale variables, while Model 
C adds the school background and demographic control 
variables. As our final model, Model D provides the full 
parameter estimates, as well as the odds as an estimate of 
effect size for each of the variables included in the model. 
As noted in Table 3, other than time, multiple background 
and control variables were significant in predicting the 
probability of failing AYP. First, while urban and small 
town were not statistically significant, Rural schools were 
significantly less likely to fail AYP than suburban schools, 
controlling for the other variables in the model. As noted by 
Singer & Willett (2003), odds less than 1.00 can be difficult 
to interpret, thus they recommend inverting the number to 
aid in interpretation. Thus, Rural schools were 1.427 times 
less likely to fail AYP than Suburban schools in the model. 
The percent student variables measuring ethnicity were all 
significant in the model, such that schools with a one 
standard deviation higher percentage of African American 
students were 1.522 times more likely to fail AYP than 
schools at the average. Interpretation of logistic regression 
coefficients beyond a difference of 0 to 1 though are 
problematic due to the non-linear relationship, so we stress 
that interpretations such as this be interpreted with caution. 
 
Additionally, schools with a one standard deviation higher 
pupil teacher ratio were 2.183 times more likely to fail 
AYP, and schools with a one standard deviation higher 
enrollment were 2.388 times more likely. As predicted since 
it is part of the calculation for AYP failure, percent met 
standard in mathematics on the state standardized TAKS 
test was negative and significant in the model. As the largest 
effect in the model, inverting the odds of 0.404 gives an 
odds of schools with a one standard deviation higher 
average percent met standard failing AYP in any one year 
2.475 times less than schools, all other variables being 
equal. Schools with higher percent attendance were 1.318 
times less likely to fail AYP. Interestingly, graduation rate 
was not significant in the final model. Overall, the final 
model accounted for an estimated 61.1% of the variance in 






Table 3: Results of fitting four discrete-time hazard models to the year of failing to meet AYP using parameter estimates. 
 
 Model A Model B Model C Model D Odds 





































































































Z Percent Free & Reduced 
Price Lunch 





Z Percent African American 
students 

























Z Percent Met Standard 
Mathematics 
   -.907*** 
(.103) 
0.404 
Z Percent Attendance    -.276* 
(.089) 
0.759 
Z Graduation rate    .039 
(.078) 
 
N 6447 6447 6124 4975  
n parameters 8 12 18 20  
-2Log-likelihood 4047.106 3785.436 3338.522 2199.564  
Chi-Square 4890.33 5152.004 5151.145 4697.251  
Cox & Snell pseudo-R
2 





Overall, this study came to three main findings. First, as one 
of the first studies to use a discrete time modeling 
framework to examine the “hazard” of a school failing to 
meet AYP, this study shows that this type of modeling 
framework works well in this policy domain and can 
provide interesting findings to help examine not only the 
most hazardous years for schools, but what variables are 
most associated with a school failing AYP. This is 
important since under NCLB and Texas education policy, 
failing AYP activates a range of sanctions that most schools 
and school staff would wish to avoid. Second, this study 
finds that variables that not part of the AYP calculation 
policy are significantly related to the probability of a school 
failing AYP in any one year. These variables include school 
locale, with Rural schools being much less likely to fail 
AYP than Suburban schools, pupil teacher ratio and school 
enrollment. We note that from a policy perspective, these 
findings suggest that the AYP policy may be affecting 
schools differently in different contexts, which would 
appear to go against the intention of the policy to sanction 
and reward schools purely on a performance basis across 
their subgroups. Third, multiple variables included within 
the AYP calculation were significant in the model. 
However, we were surprised that the graduation rate was not 
significant in the model. This may be due to multicolinearity 
issues within the model, however our preliminary 
descriptive analysis suggested that this was not an issue 
(data not shown). We suggest further research in this area.  
 
Limitations 
While we argue that our model is robust, this study is 
limited in the following ways. First, the beginning of time in 
the model was year 2003. While this corresponds with the 
beginning of the application of the full effects of NCLB in 
Texas, as the model state for NCLB, Texas’ accountability 
policies had been in effect for a decade previously. Thus, 
the true “beginning of time” for a hazard model would be 
better defined at an earlier time point. However, as a second 
issue, prior to 2003, the state standardized test was the 
TAAS, rather than TAKS, and so not only was the 
accountability regime somewhat different, estimating a 
model with two different tests through time is problematic. 
Thus, we selected the first year of the study as 2003. Third, 
within the discrete time hazard modeling framework, when 
hazard rates fall over time, unobserved heterogeneity can be 
a issue (Singer & Willet, 2003) as all time conditional 
models, such as the one used here, have an assumption of no 
unobserved heterogeneity – in that the hazard function for 
any school in the dataset is dependent only on that school’s 
predictors. We acknowledge that unobserved heterogeneity 
could be an explanation for the hazard functions noted here 
and we encourage future work in this area. However, as one 
of the first studies to examine the probability of failing AYP 
across an entire population of all high schools in a large 
state using a method that appropriately controls for the 
conditional dependent nature of the dataset, we argue that 
this study lays the foundation for future studies that could 
examine if there are unobserved variables that are 
contributing to the overall risk. 
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